FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JUNE 25, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(San Clemente, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SAN CLEMENTE INN

9:15 A.M. PDT

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the communique, which is embargoed until 1:00 o'clock Eastern time and 10:00 o'clock Pacific time. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss that with you and take your questions on the communique and also on the summit between the President and General Secretary.

For the statistics buffs in the Press Corps, the President and General Secretary spent a total of 47 hours together. They met in formal sessions with advisors or alone for 18-1/4 hours. In addition, the President and General Secretary were together 28-3/4 hours at informal gatherings, social functions and signing ceremonies, and events of that sort.

Q How much alone, face to face?

MR. ZIEGLER: Almost 10 hours. 9-1/2 hours.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: I will not go through the communique because I understand you have already had a chance to read it. Let me make a few general observations about the summit and how it fits into the general development of our foreign policy, and then I will take questions about the communique or any other part of the summit which you may wish to raise.

One good way of assessing the results of the summit is to compare last year's communique with this year's communique. Last year's communique spoke about the desirability of peaceful coexistence. It said:

"Having considered various areas of bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement in relations is possible and desirable."

This year we say that: "Both Sides are convinced that the discussions they have just held represent a further milestone in the constructive development of their relations.

"Convinced that such a development of American-Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take further major steps to give these relations maximum stability and to turn the development of friendship and cooperation between their peoples into a permanent factor for world-wide peace."

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The Indochina problem, which last year was a source of contention, has received a common expression in this document.

And finally, there has been the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Now, I have seen several comments to the effect that it is non-binding, that it is not self-enforcing, and no doubt I have contributed to this by comments that reflect my former professorial profession, so let me state our position: That no agreement in history has ever enforced itself. Every agreement in history that has been observed has depended either on the willingness of the parties to observe it or on the willingness of one or the other parties to enforce it, or on the rewards for compliance and the risks of non-compliance.

This agreement is no different from any other agreement in that respect. When great powers make an agreement with each other, they, of course, have the capability of not observing it unless the other side is prepared to draw extreme consequences. But the violation of this agreement would have serious consequences for the whole context of U.S.-Soviet relations and, conversely, the observance of this agreement can mark, as I said on Friday, a milestone in the achievement of self-restraint by the major countries, a self-restraint which is by definition the essence of peace and which we intend to observe, which we expect the Soviet Union to observe, and which can therefore provide the foundation for a new international relationship.

Of course, history is replete with changes of course and we must be vigilant and prepared for such an occurrence, unique opportunity to create a new and more peaceful system. It is an opportunity that has come about partly as a result of the enormity of the weapons that would be used in case of a conflict: partly by the depth of human aspiration towards peace: partly as a result of the complexities of a world in which the ideological expectations of any side have not been fully met.

But whatever the reasons, we consider the summit as a further advance along that road, that as these meetings become a regular feature of international life, and as we come to take them more and more for granted, the results will follow paths that will come to seem more and more natural and we would consider that one of the best signs that a peaceful world is coming into being.

So this is our assessment of the summit and I will be glad to answer any questions on this, or on what I have said, or on the communique, or anything else related to the summit.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JUNE 14, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ROOM

3:08 P.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: A number of you asked for the opportunity to see Dr. Kissinger before the Soviet summit begins next week, so Dr. Kissinger is here to give you a general rundown on the activities next week and to discuss it with you and to take some of your questions on the summit, but also will be prepared to take your questions on the recent meetings and the agreement that was reached in Paris, the communique specifically. Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: I thought of you all with nostalgia yesterday when I met the much tamer press corps in Paris. (Laughter) But Ron wouldn't let me off that easily.

I thought I would speak to you about our expectations with respect to the forthcoming summit between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, try to give you our preparations for it, what we expect to come out of it, and then I will take your questions on that or any other subject.

The President and the General Secretary agreed that there would be another summit about a year after the conclusion of the last one when they last met in Moscow in May of last year. They then discussed in general terms what the objectives should be, and how we might go about realizing them.

Since then there has been a meeting between the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko, which was quite extensive, both here in Washington and continued at Camp David. There have been frequent exchanges between the General Secretary and the President. There have been exchanges in Washington between Ambassador Dobrynin and American officials.

So the meeting that will take place next week has been carefully prepared for a period of more than a year, and it follows in outline the direction that was established at the May summit in Moscow.

We have consulted closely with our allies and we will, of course, keep them and other interested parties fully informed as these discussions proceed.

Now, let me say first what our approach is and what we expect could emerge from the summit.

With the humility that is so characteristic of me, I forgot to mention my visit to Zavidovo, in which very considerable progress was made in defining the agenda and some of the substance of these talks.

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Throughout almost the entire postwar period, with only brief interruptions, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were characterized by an atmosphere of hostility, compounded of ideological opposition, of geopolitical rivalry, and of the fact that we and the Soviet Union represented two great nuclear powers in the world on which the security of many other countries depended.

The interruptions that occurred were very frequently largely on atmospherics, and while we early in this Administration made it very clear that we were prepared to change course, expressed in the President's first Inaugural in which he called for an era of negotiation instead of confrontation, and in his press conference statement early in the Administration that we wanted to proceed on a broad front, it is nevertheless true that the first two years of the first term were characterized by many of the same attitudes or at last by many of the same tensions that have characterized the entire postwar period.

We had the building of a Soviet naval base in Cienfuegos. We had a crisis in the Middle East. We had tensions in many other parts of the world. But as a result of developments in these crises, as well as of the intensive exchange that was always going on between the President and other levels of our Government and the Soviet leaders, a change of course began to emerge early in 1971.

This change of course reflected the reality that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to peace between the great nuclear countries. Not only do they have an obligation to avoid conflict; but they have an obligation to exercise restraint in their relations to each other and their relations to third countries, and ultimately they should strive to move from the easing of tension to the achievement of positive goals for the benefit of their peoples and the peoples everywhere.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you spoke about the Soviet naval base at Cienfuegos. Do you hope to negotiate or would you like to negotiate a lowering of the Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean during this summit?

DR. KISSINGER: Our concern with respect to the Soviet naval base at Cienfuegos concerns the presence of a submarine base containing particular categories of weapons. This problem was satisfactorily settled in 1970, and we do not believe that this is a subject that will come up at the summit.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in relation to your discussion of MFN, may I ask two questions? Question one, among the private groups that the General Secretary will see, will any of those groups be Jewish-American groups with whom he will discuss the problem of Jewish immigration from Russia, and the second question is were any of the stops restricted because of the fear of demonstration by Jewish-American groups?

DR. KISSINGER: The reasons for the itinerary of the General Secretary are precisely what I gave, and has evolved exactly as I described it. With respect to the Jewish leaders, some are invited to the State Dinner on Monday night at the White House, and, of course, the General Secretary, as I said, is free to see any group which he wishes to take up contact. But no formal meeting as of now has been set.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you at all concerned at the time Brezhnev is going to be here that the Watergate hearings are going to be in progress, and especially that former counsel John Dean is going to be testifying that very week with disclosures or accusations that could be very serious in terms of the Presidency?

DR. KISSINGER: When the summit was planned, the domestic evolution was not considered. But at the same time, it was our view that we should proceed with a program that had evolved on the basis of careful negotiation over an extended period of time, that attempts to achieve a peace of benefit to all Americans and the consequences of having it take place at the same time as the hearings, I will leave to the others to judge. There was no reason for us to change the summit.

Q Do you plan any special discussion on the Middle East situation?

DR. KISSINGER: It would seem to me probable that as the leaders review areas of tension in the world, that the Middle East will be one of the areas discussed.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on disarmament two points: Are we going to propose a mutual limit on MIRVs, and also is the time right to propose a total test ban?

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Q I wanted to ask if the President's proposed foreign export licensing plan has been conveyed to the Soviets and what has been the reaction and the impact on the grain deal, for example.

DR. KISSINGER: The export license plan depends, of course, on the type of control that will be established, which is still under consideration. Now, we will have very much in mind the impact of restrictions on exports on particular countries. I think the time for the full consultation on this will be before the final program is developed and put before Congress, rather than now. There has not yet been a formal Soviet reaction to the President's speech, nor do we expect one before the arrival of the General Secretary.

Q The question was put to you rather specifically before: Do you expect that the two leaders will be calling for mutual limitations on MIRVs? Your answer, as I recall, came back generally that they will have to instruct their negotiators on this matter.

Can you be a little more precise? Are the two leaders going to try to put limitations on MIRVs in some way in this statement that will be coming out?

DR. KISSINGER: I think, as I have pointed out to you, that you cannot expect any precise solution of any one problem. What you can expect is a general direction that might emerge, but I don't want to be more specific until they have talked.

Q Dr. Kissinger, will the President bring up with the General Secretary the matter of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: We have, on previous occasions, dealt with the question of Jewish emigration within the framework consistent with the Soviet sovereignty, and as a result, we received a communication in April in which the Soviet Government informed us that the emigration tax, which was, after all, the reason for the specific congressional restrictions, would be waived.

We will certainly, in the appropriate manner, discuss the subject, but I don't think any useful purpose is served by making it a public issue at this time.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was that a written communication or a verbal communication?

DR. KISSINGER: We have a procedure by which verbal communications are sometimes handed to us in written form so that we are sure to understand it. So its technical status is an oral communication which, however, has been conveyed to us in a form that its precision is unmistakeable.

Q You don't mention Vietnam or the balanced force reduction or European Security Conference as subjects to be taken up. Will they be taken up, and do you expect any results on those subjects?

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE JUNE 22, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

EXECUTIVE BRIEFING ROOM

10:42 A.M., EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: While we are waiting for Henry, I think you have had a chance to read the agreement. Just let me give you this very quickly, because we are asked this, from time to time, a rundown on the amount of time that the President and the Secretary have spent together, according to our calculations.

Total time spent together is 26 hours and 15 minutes. This includes all of the time together in the cars, helicopter and dinners and meetings and so forth. Formal meetings, 11 hours and 57 minutes. They have spent, during this time together, about five or six hours in head-to-head private discussions.

They, of course, will have an opportunity to meet further on the plane to California, later this afternoon, about 4 or 4:15, and then will spend the weekend in California together.

Q Is the five to six hours included in the 11 hours?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, that is included. The question is were there any meetings this morning, and no, there were not.

Q Do they intend to meet in California?

MR. ZIEGLER: They are due to meet only at the signing ceremony today and then they will have five hours on the plane together.

Q Could you clarify what the five and six hours are included in? I didn't hear the question.

MR. ZIEGLER: That is the time the two leaders have spent together.

Q Is that included in the 11 hours and 57 minutes?

MR. ZIELGER: Yes, it is.

Q Can you tell us anything about the schedule?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me do that later, Jim.

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I think all of you know that the President and General Secretary will sign an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear war at 12:30. You have that material, and Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss the agreement with you.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me put this agreement first in its context, describe what it is seeking to achieve, and then go through its specific provisions, a little bit of its history, and then I will take your questions.

The principal course of the foreign policy of this Administration ever since 1969 has been to set up what the President has called a structure of peace, by which we mean an international system less geared to the management of crises, less conscious of constant eruptions of conflict, in which the principal participants operate with a consciousness of stability and permanence.

This requires that all of the nations operate with a sense of responsibility, and it puts a particular obligation on the two great nuclear powers that have the capacity to destroy mankind and whose conflicts have produced so many of the crises of the post-war period.

In achieving this objective, the United States has operated on many levels. We have always believed that it required adequate strength to deter aggression. But we also have believed that we have to move from the period of military confrontation to a period which is characterized more by restraint, and eventually cooperation in our dealings with the other great nuclear superpower. The President, from the day of his first Inauguration, has emphasized that we wanted to move from confrontation to negotiation.

In those negotiations we have operated on many levels. We have attempted to remove specific causes of tension. We have attempted to forge specific instruments of cooperation. And finally, we have attempted to develop certain principles of conduct by which the two great nuclear countries could guide their expectations and by which both relations to each other and in their relations to third countries, they could calm the atmosphere and replace purely military measures by a new attitude of a cooperative international system.

It is in this spirit that last year in Moscow the United States and the Soviet Union signed certain principles of conduct which were described then as a roadmap on a road that no one was forced to travel, but that they wanted to travel, and was there for the two major countries.

I believe we have traveled on this road in the last year, and, therefore, it was decided to formalize some of these principles in an agreement, to extend them in some respects, particularly concerning consultation. The origin of the negotiation, as it turned out, was at the last session of the Moscow Summit meeting when there were some general exchanges with respect to how to control nuclear weapons in a political and diplomatic sense, beyond the negotiations going on in strategic arms limitations.

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However, we believe that this document can contribute to an atmosphere that will accelerate the discussions on strategic arms limitations, and as I said yesterday, we consider the reduction of arms an important element of the strategic arms limitation talks. And it has been so expressed in the principles that were signed yesterday.

But we cannot anticipate what may be negotiated by unilateral actions on our part.

Q Dr. Kissinger, --

DR. KISSINGER: Haven't you asked a question already?

Q I reminded you of part of Burnie's question.

DR. KISSINGER: You are only entitled to short versions.

Q My question, your explanation of not putting it in treaty form is based in part on it not involving any positive obligations on the United State's part.

How is it different from alimited nuclear test ban treaty in that respect? Could you expand on why it didn't need to be a treaty or shouldn't be one?

DR. KISSINGER: The limited nuclear test ban reflected a significant change in our arms policy that has been carried out until this time. This is really a statement of policies that we intend to pursue and have to be applied in individual cases.

It is, therefore, more in the nature of a formalization of a declaration of principles rather than of a specific set of obligations that can be applied automatically to create specific circumstances.

Q In your expose today, you used the word, "super power". Ambassador Zamyatin spoke to him about this. He said the Soviet Union is not a super power, and they are only big powers. He said this was invented by the Chinese.

My other question is about Isreal. When we come to the agreement, we are concerned that Isreal has so far not signed a partial nuclear treaty. There was an article by Flora Lewis, which referred to you, saying you had a study made by the Rand Corporation on how we can protect Isreal with the atomic bomb. Within Articles IV and VI, will you as an ally of Isreal, plan to try to bring Zamyatin to sign this treaty, or a partial treaty?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, with respect to the comments of Ambassador Zamyatin, I welcome the humility thathe has expressed, and it was not adequately reflected due to certain personality problems in my own comment.

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With respect to the Rand study, I have never seen such a study, and I know it has been written about although this is a big government and there are many studies floating around in it. They don't necessarily mean, however, that they have any connection with American foreign policy.

Thirdly, the implications of the agreement on the actions of other countries with respect to existing multilateral agreements, I do not want to speculate about. We could not assume that this agreement imposes on the United States a particular additional obligation with respect to treaties whose obligations are already clear.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you interpret this document as one that supercedes the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine?

DR. KISSINGER: This document makes no distinction in its application between the domestic structure of various forms of countries.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is this document a renunciation of atomic war, and if not, why not?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I will take you along on future negotiations to fill in gaps that we leave. But this document is designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by imposing restraints on the major countries with respect to nuclear war, and with respect to the use of force in general.

Therefore, it does not address the question of what happens if war cannot be prevented, because that is not its purpose. Its purpose is to prevent wars. It is not a renunciation of a particular form of war if war cannot be prevented, but we hope that it will make a major contribution to the prevention of war, and therefore, your question will not have to be addressed.

Q Did you discuss the concept of not using nuclear force first against each other, and why wasn't that included?

DR. KISSINGER: We cannot discuss many things that individual members of the press corps would like to have as part of other agreements.

Q That is a recognized international concept, how to prevent nuclear war, isn't it, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: There are two ways you can look at how to prevent nuclear war. One is first by preventing war, and the second is by imposing upon ourselves on specific restraints with respect to particular categories of weapons if war cannot be avoided.

We choose to go the road of attempting to prevent war, and thereby nuclear war, because many other countries depend upon what actions will be taken in case an agression occurs. Therefore, we did not believe it would contribute to peace if we made particular distinctions as to categories of weapons in case of war.

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Have you detected any change, perhaps, in the Soviet attitude concerning the current fighting in Cambodia, and particularly, do the Soviets disapprove at all of any activities that Hanoi may be undertaking in Cambodia, either supply or military?

DR. KISSINGER: First, let us get the Cambodian problem into perspective. We are talking here of the very last phase of a very prolonged war. We are not talking here of the beginning of another Indochina conflict. I don't want to characterize the Soviet attitude toward Cambodia. I think the Soviet Union should speak for itself.

I think that this sentence here states our view exactly: that we agreed that the future of Cambodia should be left to the Cambodian people, and that peace should come consistent with the sovereignty and the rights of self-determination of the Cambodians. We are actively engaged in attempting to bring this about at this moment, and we believe, as I said previously, that as the realtionships among the great powers fall into clearer focus, as one looks at these areas less from their symbolic aspect of either being the spearhead of wars of national liberation or of being a conspiracy directed, it was thought once, from Peking, I think that all countries can adopt a more responsible attitude toward the conflict in Indochina and a more diassociated attitude than was the case in the 1960s.

Q My impression is that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, whether or not it is granted is no longer a serious obstacle to the development of long-term trade. Is that the case?

DR. KISSINGER:: No, we believe that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union is important for the development of large-scale trade, and it is extremely important to the development of Soviet-American relations. This was part of the series of understandings in a whole complex of relationships between us and the Soviet Union last year, and it would cast serious doubt on our ability to perform our side of understandings and agreements if, in each case, that part of an agreement that is carried out later by one side or the other is then made the subject of additional conditions that were not part of the original negotiation and, therefore, I would say that for both symbolic and substantive reasons, and substantively both economic and political, it would be very unfortunate if the request to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, which means nondiscriminatory status vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were not granted.

Q Can you address yourself to two impressions?

DR. KISSINGER: Impressions or questions?

Q However you like; impressions and a question. First, is there here a signal to the Russians that they have a free hand where China is concerned, as a follow-up to an earlier question; and the second impression, Dr. Kissinger, in the 89 words devoted to the Middle East, one gets the impression that the Soviet Union and the United States are as far apart as before?

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